The New Political Agreement in Libya February 2021,
Challenges and Opportunities for Success
Dr. Muhammad Abdul Hafeez Al-Sheikh
Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Jufra – Libya
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the outcomes of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, which is considered the most important political initiative to end the political and institutional division in Libya after the “Skhirat” agreement. The paper believes that the Libyan success in the elections for the presidency of the government and the new Presidential Council on February 5, 2021, is a clear international breakthrough after the major role played by the acting UN envoy “Stephanie Williams”, behind which stands the American role, and it is a significant breakthrough in the approach line, and an important and encouraging opportunity to get out of the current Libyan crisis.
This paper also discusses the challenges of obstruction that could hinder the success of Abdul Hamid Dabaiba’s government in performing its duties, the extent of concessions that the Libyan political parties should make, and the extent of flexibility that armed groups should show in order to make it successful, before the entire country slides into a quagmire of chaos and conflict. In addition, it discusses the intersections of regional and international powers and their points of divergence with the current Libyan situation, and their positive and negative impacts on Libya’s chances of emerging from the current crisis.
The success of Abdul Hamid Dabaiba’s government in achieving stability remains dependent on the continued support of the United Nations and its support mission, which requires taking concrete steps by imposing strict sanctions on the Libyan parties obstructing the dialogue, as well as the regional and international parties that violate the arms embargo on Libya. However, if the United Nations and the active international powers fail to contain the Libyan crisis, and the regional powers do not agree on a transition plan to reach the elections scheduled for the end of December 2021, which opens the door to a new extension of the transitional phase, a scenario similar to the Skhirat scenario and the Presidential Council that emerged from it will be repeated. Consequently, tension will dominate the situation, and it will have a strong impact on the outcome of the political situation in Libya in the future.
Introduction:
In light of the data of the Libyan scene after the revolution that overthrew the Gaddafi regime in 2011, and the resulting deep rift that affected Libyan society and its political institutions, the Libyan state entered a maze of bitter conflict with multiple tools and participants, in the absence of security and military institutions capable of carrying out their tasks. The ruling Libyan elites who took over the management of public affairs and drew up plans for its course after the fall of the regime were not nationally and institutionally mature, which contributed to the encouragement and entry of external forces that took the Libyan arena as a suitable stage to settle their strategic scores related to the competition, and to highlight the prestige of presence, influence, and impact, in ways that do not take into account Libya’s vital interests.
The size of the intervention, its competitive intensity, and the crowding of international and regional actors in the Libyan domestic arena, intensified in light of the inability of the Libyan parties to act independently, so the country entered into a proxy war, in favor of international and regional agendas, until their interventions led to further hardening of the positions of the Libyan parties, so that they contributed negatively to the fragmentation of the internal reality, and reinforced the divisions of political opinion, and widened the rift between the different social forces, which prevented their rapprochement, so that Libya would then go divided within itself between the warring East and West, which made the option of a settlement between the parties a problem that is difficult to decipher and resolve all its complications. Faced with such a polarizing scene, the disparate Libyan political forces found no way out but to ride the wave of interventions, without controlling their paths, the intersections of external powers and their points of divergence.
Despite the tireless support efforts made by the United Nations and its mission to end the conflict in Libya completely, they did not achieve a real breakthrough to bring together the Libyan parties and overcome the dilemmas that represent the essence of the Libyan conflict. All political initiatives and options did not succeed in presenting visions and maps for power-sharing, given the regional and international constraints and their role in fueling the conflict between the Libyan parties.
The Libyan scene did not know a calm except with the recent international efforts, which emerged from the Berlin and Geneva conferences with a settlement that resulted in a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, which is a significant breakthrough in the approach line, to give the rounds of the political agreement a chance to succeed, and find a satisfactory way out for the settlement between the Libyan parties. Positive indicators are beginning to emerge on the horizon suggesting that the long-standing crisis is about to end, especially after the success of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in electing a new executive authority on February 5, 2021, and granting it the confidence of the House of Representatives, which is an important step towards ending the state of division and restoring the spirit of partnership between the parties to the Libyan political action. Accordingly, the set of local, regional and international variables constitute both an opportunity and a challenge for the new government in Libya.
The importance of the study lies in the fact that it addresses the outcomes of the new political agreement in Libya, which is considered the most important political initiative after the “Skhirat” agreement, and the chances of success of the new government in light of the challenges facing it in achieving the roadmap in the transitional phase. It also explores the possible paths of the Libyan crisis, especially with regard to the impact of forming the new government on Libya’s unity, security, stability and national sovereignty.
The study seeks to achieve a number of objectives, the most important of which are:
1- Tracking the stages of the Libyan political dialogue and its paths, leading to the elections of the new Libyan government and identifying the overall circumstances and contexts surrounding the mechanism of its formation and analyzing its political implications.
2- Monitoring the set of difficulties that hinder the work of the new government in the coming stages, and the chances of its success in achieving stability and the return of the Libyan state unified with its institutions.
3- Clarifying the impact of regional and international interventions on the settlement process and the importance of curbing those interventions.
In light of
Therefore, the problem of the study stems from a central question that stems primarily from the successive variables that are happening in Libya in light of the turbulent scene: What are the chances of success of the new Libyan political agreement in light of the challenges ahead and the future prospects that the Libyan state is heading towards?
Several sub-questions branch out from the main question:
To what extent is the new Libyan government able to achieve security and stability and hold elections on December 24, 2021?
Are the Libyan parties prepared to make the necessary concessions for the success of the political agreement?
Will the international community continue to provide sufficient support to push the settlement process, so that it can curb the influence and interventions of international and regional powers such as Russia, France, Turkey and Egypt, so that the conflict ends completely, or will it leave the new government to face the challenges of the next stage alone?
Here we assume that all Libyan national forces, regional countries, and the UN mission will move to support the new government and unify efforts to maintain stability and the unity of the political entity without the outbreak of any potential conflict, due to the risks it poses to the future of the settlement and its success, and the fate of security and stability for the countries of the region as a whole.
First: Libyan political dialogue stations:
The political consensus process in Libya has witnessed multiple stations and paths, and its contents and outcomes have differed, starting with the political agreement in “Skhirat” in 2015. Morocco was present in the Libyan political scene, standing at an equal distance between the parties in the hope of the success of the settlement, and developing approaches that are satisfactory to both parties.
The reconciliation calendar has remained open and ongoing, and has moved from one country to another. Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Bouznika, and Cairo. The debate continued about the most effective ways to a reality that would restore the path to a political settlement and prepare the atmosphere for effective intervention after an unreconciled experience of the problem of previous interventions, opening the way out of the abyss, through which the Libyans can enjoy a fair and sustainable peace ().
In the context of regional reactions to the troubled Libyan situation, the political agreement, when signed in Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015, constituted an important success on the path to resolving the crisis, after the UN mission pushed the parties to the Libyan conflict to dialogue with regional and international support. However, judging by the results of the implementation of the political agreement, it did not succeed in achieving political stability and preventing the conflict from taking violent forms. The negotiators who reached the stage of signing the settlement agreement were unable to achieve comprehensive reconciliation and put an end to the internal conflict ().
Thus, instead of the political agreement representing the beginning of a new phase of consensus, it became a major reason for deepening the social division, and in particular consecrated the disparity between the conflicting parties in the east and west of the country, and this created a highly fragmented map, which allowed for more foreign interventions. The result, as we saw it: two governments in the country, a parliament and an independent government in eastern Libya headed by Abdullah al-Thani, opposite to the Government of National Accord in Tripoli in the west, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, and within their scope, not only politics and ideology overlapped, but also interests, political, security, and economic agendas, both local and foreign, within the framework of the great attraction.
It is necessary to point out the contradiction that has come to characterize the positions of external powers, as on the one hand, they call for a political solution to the Libyan crisis and support the “Skhirat” agreement and its outcomes, and support the efforts of the UN mission with the aim of achieving a realistic approach to bring together the Libyan parties, and at the same time, they fuel the conflict instead of resolving it, through military escalation in the field; to obstruct the path of a peaceful political solution and paralyze it().
As part of the settlement efforts, a meeting was held in the French capital, Paris, in July 2017, bringing together the Libyan parties, in an attempt to bring their viewpoints closer together. The agreement stressed the need for a ceasefire in order to secure a political solution through national reconciliation, as a gateway to ending the crisis. French efforts did not stop there, but rather worked to hold another international meeting in May 2018, which brought together the two parties to the Libyan conflict, in addition to representatives of more than 20 countries, and a group of international and regional organizations. The meeting resulted in an agreement stipulating the need to hold presidential and parliamentary elections, with the establishment of constitutional foundations for the elections and holding accountable anyone who obstructs the electoral process. In addition to supporting the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya regarding a timetable for adopting the constitution, unifying financial and economic institutions, especially the Central Bank, and strengthening the building of security and military institutions under UN supervision. However, the agreement faced many obstacles, and the outcome was failure to reach a political settlement(). As the UN efforts to get the country out of its deep crisis continue, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, announced the organization of the “National Comprehensive Forum” in the city of Ghadames in mid-April 2019. The UN mission expressed its keenness not to exclude any party, and extended an invitation to various Libyan political groups. However, the escalation of the military conflict and its entry into a critical phase with Khalifa Haftar launching a comprehensive attack on the capital, Tripoli, on April 4, 2019, resulted in the loss of the opportunity for intensive UN efforts to explore the positions of the Libyan parties towards the settlement. It also resulted in broad and varied international reactions that reflect the extent of fear of the development of the situation towards the worst, which left serious concerns not only within Libya, but also in all the countries of the region that see the Libyan crisis as a serious threat to their security and stability. Amidst intense diplomatic activity around Libya, the Berlin Conference was held on January 10, 2020, at the initiative of Germany. Its aim was to accelerate efforts to achieve a ceasefire between the two parties to the Libyan conflict, as well as to oblige external powers to stop supporting the Libyan parties with weapons, and to push towards a peaceful solution (). However, it failed to achieve this, as the active powers did not fulfill their pledges.
Related to ending foreign interference in the Libyan crisis. Turkey began direct, declared and qualitative intervention, through which it targeted Haftar’s forces, supply lines and bases, which were then forced to withdraw from the vicinity of Tripoli to the borders of Sirte in the east and Jufra in the south (). Had it not been for international pressure and the Egyptian leadership’s decisive announcement on June 20, 2020, that Sirte and Jufra were a red line for Egypt, which the forces of the Government of National Accord and the forces supporting it could not cross, the latter would have reached the outskirts of Benghazi, which would further complicate the Libyan situation and drag the country into a real disaster (). In the face of such a critical scene, the Libyan crisis has remained in place, as neither a military resolution is possible nor a political solution is likely, in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international will to put an end to this tragedy. It seems that the environment of military balance between the parties to the Libyan conflict; Especially after the entry of Turkish political and military support, it created a favorable environment and an encouraging climate for the United States to enter with international cover on the settlement line and resolve it towards a final solution. This contributed to stopping the battles on the outskirts of Sirte and Jufra, and opened a margin for diplomatic movement; with the full conviction of both parties that the political solution is an alternative option to the military solution, which seems to be decided by a specific party out of reach, in light of the balance of the situation on the ground, and the conviction of the external powers involved in the Libyan conflict that bullets are useless in excluding the other party from the political equation, so that they eventually reach an understanding based on a permanent ceasefire, and sitting at a dialogue table with the aim of reaching a political settlement that results in a new consensus government that includes the parties. Not to mention the exposure and exposure of the agenda of the external powers that are charging the Libyan arena and mobilizing it towards war, instead of pushing the Libyan forces towards rapprochement, or a settlement that spares Libya destruction, draining its human energies, and wasting its resources and capabilities(). Second: The importance of the international role in parallel with the active American presence:
Approaches began to develop on both sides of the Libyan conflict, tending to adopt moderate political behavior and prefer settlements, when those parties realized that the cost of continuing the conflict is greater than the cost of abandoning it. All of this created a suitable environment and an encouraging climate for a real revival and realistic translation of the Skhirat agreements and the Geneva negotiations arising from the Berlin understandings, specifically the military ones. The Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Libya, Stephanie Williams, announced that the country is going through a dangerous turning point, indicating that there is no alternative to a political settlement reached through negotiations on an early resumption of the peace process. The statement of former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo came as a support for this, saying that “the countries interfering in Libyan affairs must stop their hands as soon as possible, and leave room for the Libyan parties to reach quick solutions, given the risks of the long crisis to the security and stability of Libya and the entire region().
The Geneva Agreement, under UN auspices, for a permanent ceasefire in Libya represents data in the Libyan scene, which says that the recent resolution of the Libyan file came through the efforts of the UN envoy Stephanie Williams, without neglecting the strong and effective American entry into the settlement line. As a result, Haftar’s forces retreated from the vicinity of the capital, Tripoli, and the opportunity became available for reconciliation efforts to bear fruit, after the two parties to the Libyan conflict reached a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The two parties agreed to form a joint military committee (5 + 5), and it was emphasized that the solution to the problem remains in the hands of the Libyans themselves. In light of this, the acting UN envoy Stephanie Williams announced in a statement that “the Geneva talks culminated in a historic achievement, after the parties reached To a permanent ceasefire agreement throughout Libya,” she added, noting that this achievement represents an important turning point towards achieving peace and stability in Libya. This is contingent on the forces of negative foreign intervention lifting their hand from influencing and exerting strong pressure on the Libyan parties.
However, the variable in the Libyan scene became clear through the active American presence, to give the rounds of the political agreement a chance to succeed, and then find a way out for the settlement and develop approaches that are satisfactory to the Libyan parties, which raises several questions about the reasons and circumstances of the absence of the American role from the settlement process in the previous stage, and its recent emergence after debates and repercussions that complicated the Libyan scene? Is the American approach moving towards curbing foreign interventions in order to resolve the settlement process in Libya, in a way that ensures the return of security and stability and preserves Libya’s unity and sovereignty, or is it nothing more than an exchange of roles between international actors, which does not take into account the real Libyan settlement?
From the above, it is clear that the United States’ heavy involvement in the Libyan crisis played a decisive role in pressuring both sides of the Libyan conflict and directing them towards an agreement as quickly as possible. This role comes within the framework of Washington’s keenness to curb the growing Russian presence and influence supporting Haftar, and to prevent Russia from taking over the Libyan oil market, which has become a source of concern for America and raises its fears. This is what prompted it to overlook Turkey’s intervention and its enjoyment of a wide margin in Libya, to stop the Russian expansion and its allies from the Arab camp. Hence, America is waiting for the right opportunity to enter the Libyan crisis after the conflict has exhausted both sides, and no party is able to resolve the conflict in its favor. America supports regional powers to maintain balances, in order to exhaust the active forces and reshape the map of influence and balances, and reserves intervention for the last moment(). From a careful national reading perspective, the solution will not come from international or regional powers immersed in the ongoing military conflict, pulling the strings of the Libyan file from the perspective of their ambitions, and mobilizing and filling the arena with enough to keep the flame of conflict burning between the parties, and the national bleeding continues, which is what brought Libya to this difficult end.
It cannot be relied upon to propose realistic and acceptable solutions, let alone play the role of mediator and acceptable to both parties to the Libyan conflict. The same applies to France, Russia, the Emirates, Egypt, Turkey and other conflicting powers in Libya().
The United States remains the only player capable of leading a comprehensive effort to reach an agreement agreed upon by all actors on the Libyan scene, primarily because the United States is uniquely capable of pressuring international and regional actors in Libya to stop their support for proxies on the ground, and pushing the various parties to the conflict to enter into a negotiation process based on good intentions().
Third: Reading the outcomes of the political agreement and its challenges:
The new Libyan government.. Formation mechanism:
The discussions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum began, and the first round of it was launched in Tunisia, under the supervision of the United Nations Support Mission on November 9, 2020, with the participation of 75 figures; Among them are 13 members of the House of Representatives, and the same number of members of the Supreme Council of State, while the rest of the figures were distributed among different political and tribal spectrums. A roadmap was agreed upon for a transitional phase, which included unifying the executive authority that has been divided since 2014, and starting to implement a package of security, military, political, and economic measures; ending with parliamentary and presidential elections on December 24, 2021, leading to the establishment of permanent governing institutions().
The Advisory Committee of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum then held a meeting in Geneva, from January 13 to 16, 2021, to determine the mechanism for selecting a unified executive authority. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya had approved a relatively complex mechanism for nomination and voting to avoid failure to elect leadership for the transitional phase, or the victory of a team that does not meet the required conditions agreed upon by the members of the forum who met in the Tunis round, which are to select a president for the Presidential Council from the east and two deputies from the west and south, and a prime minister from the west(). None of the candidates for the presidency of the government and the Presidential Council achieved sufficient votes in the first round that took place on February 3, 2021, although Aguila Saleh, the head of the Supreme Council of State Khaled Al-Mishri, and Abdul Majeed Saif Al-Nasr led the scene at the level of the three regions. However, the failure of the individual vote to decide the competition led to the move towards the list voting stage, after none of them obtained the required percentage of votes according to the electoral college mechanism for the three regions (Tripoli, Barqa, and Fezzan); where the mechanism approved by the UN mission stipulated that each list should include four candidates, according to the previously agreed upon composition().
None of the four candidate lists obtained the two-thirds of the votes required to vote in the first stage; where the list headed by Aguila Saleh came in first place, followed by the list of Muhammad Yunus al-Manfi, and these are the two lists that participated in the second and final round of voting().
The final round of elections took place on February 5, 2021, and according to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, two lists competed. The first is considered to be well-known names, and includes Speaker of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh, Minister of Interior in the Government of National Accord Fathi Bashagha, Commander of the Western Military Region Osama Juwaili, and politician from the south and Libya’s Ambassador to Morocco Abdul Majeed Saif al-Nasr. The second list includes Muhammad Yunus al-Manfi, a member of the General National Congress from the city of Tobruk, who is a supporter of the February Revolution and was not a supporter of Operation Dignity launched by Khalifa Haftar. He joined the authority of the Government of National Accord as an ambassador to Greece. His two deputies, Musa al-Koni, who is from the south and a former deputy head of the Presidential Council, and Abdullah al-Lafi, a member of the House of Representatives from the west, are moderate figures who have positions opposing the internal fighting between the Libyan parties. As for Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, he is a businessman from the city of Misrata, who held several positions in economic institutions during Gaddafi’s rule, and was not known for his involvement in politics, or for having any political positions on the current events in the country ().
After the votes were counted, the acting UN representative to Libya, Stephanie Williams, announced the victory of the second list, with a majority of the votes of the members of the forum, with 39 votes out of 74, so that Muhammad Younis Al-Menfi would be the head of the Presidential Council, Abdullah Hussein Al-Lafi and Musa Al-Koni as his deputies, and Abdul Hamid Muhammad Al-Dbeibah as the prime minister. The failure of the list headed by Aguila Saleh and the victory of the list headed by Muhammad Al-Menfi came as a surprise to many ().
These results represented a new mix-up of the Libyan political map, as names that were believed to be large and influential in the elections disappeared, such as the list that included Saleh, Bashagha, Juwaili, and Saif al-Nasr. In exchange for the disappearance of these names, new names appeared, perhaps the most prominent of which are; Al-Manfi, Al-Lafi, and Dabaiba.
Following the announcement of the new government in Libya, it was widely welcomed, regionally and internationally; as a joint statement was issued by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy welcoming the agreement reached at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. For its part, the United Nations welcomed the agreement, and called for respecting the voting results and a safe and smooth handover of power, and the exit of foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya according to the timetable previously agreed upon in the Joint Military Committee in October 2020.
The United States of America also called for ensuring a smooth handover of all powers and duties to the new executive authority, and pledged to hold accountable those who obstruct its work or undermine the political process in Libya. For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan contacted both Al-Menfi and Dabaiba, and pledged to them that his country would continue to provide support for
Preserving the unity of Libya and contributing to the establishment of peace, security and stability for its people. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Morocco also congratulated the Libyan parties on reaching a national consensus to manage the transitional phase().
There is no doubt that the support received by the new Libyan government is a clear message that the international community will stand by it to complete the terms of the political agreement, and will grant it full legitimacy in all its efforts to unify state institutions, restore security and stability and expel foreign fighters and mercenaries from the country.
Internally, both the Government of National Accord in Tripoli and the interim government in the east welcomed the election of the new government, and Fayez al-Sarraj expressed his hope that the general elections would be held on time after providing the appropriate conditions to lay the foundation for building a state of democratic institutions. For his part, Abdullah al-Thani congratulated the head and members of the unity government on gaining the confidence of the House of Representatives, expressing his readiness to hand over all tasks without obstacles(). In the same context, the head of the Supreme Council of State, Khaled Al-Mishri, described the election of the new executive authority as an important step towards getting out of the crisis, ending the division, and unifying institutions. Despite losing the competition and winning the position of Prime Minister, the former Minister of Interior in the Government of National Accord, Fathi Bashagha, considered that the vote on the new government embodied democracy in its clearest form. As for the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, he pledged to support the government if it gained the confidence of Parliament and implemented the roadmap, especially preparing for the upcoming elections(). After his government gained the confidence of the House of Representatives, Dabaiba called in a direct speech “only on all Libyans to make up for the period of division, forget the grudges of the past, overcome the imaginary borders we created, and work for Libya. He stated that his government will only raise the slogan of a united Libya,” stressing his commitment to supporting the Presidential Council in achieving the national reconciliation entitlement, and in achieving the elections entitlement, by supporting the High National Elections Commission. He said that there are entitlements awaiting us, most notably the adoption of the elections law, the local government law, and the country’s general budget. He added that his government “will commit to holding the elections on time,” referring to preparing the conditions for holding the elections on December 24, 2021.
Libyans hope that the new government will put an end to the transitional phase that has been ongoing for ten years, and although the remaining period of time is relatively insufficient to begin achieving the government’s vision and goals, it will face complex political, security, societal, and economic obstacles that may be intractable at the present time, but they are not an impossible issue to address.
2- Obstacles facing the new Libyan government:
It is acknowledged that Libya has made remarkable progress in resolving the crisis and ending the conflict completely. Despite the local, international, and regional positions welcoming the settlement agreement, it is likely that the new formation, which is not directly supported by influential forces on the ground, will face great difficulties in the coming stages at several levels.
Politically, the biggest challenge is a challenge that includes all political levels through the ability of the new government to organize elections on a democratic basis on December 24, 2021. This requires the establishment of an independent electoral commission and the writing of a unified constitution for the country that outlines the features and shape of the future political system in Libya. The narrow time frame of no more than nine months, even with the formation phase passing smoothly and the parliament granting it confidence, is likely to confuse the roadmap and prevent reaching the general elections on time().
The achievement of tangible results by the Dabaiba government on the ground will remain at stake, and the challenge of implementing the political agreement will remain great, especially since Libya is witnessing an unstable and fragile security situation, which has produced a number of security threats and dangers as a result of the transitional phase, some of which are related to the state as an entity and the fragile state the country is going through, in light of the absence of security and military institutions capable of carrying out their tasks. Political, partisan and ideological conflicts have increased within it, and criminal gangs and armed militias have spread terribly, and their influence has increased and they have extended their control over various areas of the country, exploiting the erosion of state control. The influence of extremist and terrorist groups is also increasing in various areas, and ISIS continues to carry out increasing attacks in various parts of the country. This represents the biggest obstacles facing the new government and the path of the political solution. Despite the expected great support from the United Nations and its support mission in Libya, it may contribute to obstructing the work of the new Libyan government, especially after the UN mission imposed the rule of dividing political positions among the three Libyan regions (Tripoli, Barqa, Fezzan), which makes the government’s task difficult in a context where quotas and political, tribal and regional appeasement are the most important sorting factor. Despite the announcement by Prime Minister “Dabaiba” that his choice will be to rely on technocrats().
As for the economic issue, a number of challenges arise for the new government, due to the deterioration of the situation as a result of the war and conflict and the cessation of oil exports, which is the main source of income for the country, and the collapse of the local currency, which has declined to an unprecedented level. This has negatively affected the living conditions that Libyans suffer from, such as the absence of basic services such as power outages, and the lack of cash liquidity, in addition to the spread of poverty and unemployment, which requires contributing to the creation of new jobs to reduce the increasing unemployment among young people. This cannot be achieved without reducing dependence on oil as a primary source of income, diversifying the structure of production and exports, developing infrastructure, and improving the business environment to attract foreign investments through the rule of law.
Hence, increasing the effort of the equivalent
The corruption scandal is a real test for the Dabaiba government. The steps that must be taken to disclose revenues transparently and spend them as required will undoubtedly give an idea of the fate of this government.
There is another issue that the new government must address; the problems suffered by the health sector are deepening and worsening due to the severe shortage of equipment and supplies, and the absence of specialized medical personnel with experience and competence. The novel coronavirus pandemic is at the forefront of the most important issues that the government must address urgently.
Socially, there are challenges related to the consequences of Gaddafi’s rule, the circumstances and conditions that resulted from his overthrow, and the sharp polarization and clear social rift that it generated. It is impossible to talk about national reconciliation, and there is a large legacy of grudges and grievances that eat away at Libyan society and its unity and national constants. Without an agreement that bridges the gap of grievances and achieves justice among the components of Libyan society, the settlement will not be effective in achieving a societal structure that helps in the success of institutions, the implementation of the law, and the achievement of security and stability. There is no doubt that any real comprehensive national reconciliation would create a breakthrough and settlement between the parties, leading to a comprehensive vision that goes beyond this crisis, which, if prolonged, will lead to risks and negative repercussions on Libya and the entire region.
On the external challenge front, the new Libyan government faces several challenges, most notably the liberation of the Libyan parties from the pressures and tragedies of negative interventions, overcoming the reality of fear and the lines drawn by external powers, and more importantly, completely freeing themselves from the cloak of their dictates, and being careful once again not to fall under the influence of absurd external powers. Most of the reasons for intervention feed the state of disagreement and spread hatred or the mental image of each party about the other. Therefore, it is difficult to overcome them without the availability of a sincere national will that goes beyond the obstacle of narrow factional and regional interests, the logic of mistrust, and the belief of each party that the other party cannot be bypassed and eliminated, and finding acceptable formulas that protect the interests of all parties according to the logic of national partnership. Without that, the new government cannot advance towards achieving security and stability in Libya.
The issue of ending the foreign military presence and the departure of 20,000 armed fighters and mercenaries is another important issue for the new Libyan government, and one of the most important challenges it will face. The deadline has passed without the Libyan Joint Military Commission (5+5), resulting from the October 25, 2020 agreement, being able to force mercenaries and foreign fighters to leave Libyan territory, which portends the possibility of a return to armed conflict().
In a statement to the Russian Sputnik Agency, Yasin Aktay, advisor to the Turkish president, said that “the agreements concluded by his country’s government with the Government of National Accord headed by Al-Sarraj will not be affected by the choice of the new interim government, explaining that Turkey is present in Libya at the explicit invitation of the Libyan people and the Government of National Accord, and that the new government does not oppose these agreements or the Turkish presence in the country, but rather supports the Turkish role there”().
In light of the external constraints facing the political settlement, the Libyan parties must be careful, as any international or regional force involved in the ongoing military conflict cannot be expected to bring realistic and acceptable solutions, let alone play the role of mediator and acceptable to the two parties to the Libyan conflict. Although France claims to seek reconciliation between the two parties to the Libyan conflict, and to adopt the agreements that addressed this file, the latest of which was the Moroccan “Skhirat” agreement on December 17, 2015, it also tried to bring together the Libyan parties at the Paris Conference in 2017, and supported the results of the “Berlin” Conference in Germany on January 19, 2020. At the same time, it supported Haftar, and the clear French position has collapsed, especially since the killing of three French soldiers in a helicopter crash in the city of Benghazi in 2015. This caused confusion for the French position, which prompted it to acknowledge its intervention alongside Khalifa Haftar, logistically, militarily and intelligence-wise, not to mention its preparation of a military station to control drones to carry out military objectives against the internationally recognized Libyan Government of National Accord. A French diplomat stated, “Yes, we support Haftar, but not to the point of being able to reach the seat of power”().
The matter remains subject to the political will of the Libyan parties, and the extent of their seriousness in achieving comprehensive national reconciliation and showing sufficient flexibility in dealing with thorny issues and overcoming obstacles that may hinder reaching a comprehensive political settlement. The matter also depends on the seriousness of the international community, especially the external powers active in the Libyan scene, to strengthen the international role, led by the United States and the European Union, and to direct it towards curbing the influence and interventions of regional and international powers, such as Turkey, Egypt, the Emirates, Qatar, Russia, France, and Italy, so that the Libyans go to a comprehensive settlement that ends the state of chaos and instability that the country has been suffering from since 2011. Fourth: The vision of the new government and its mechanisms for holding elections on December 24, 2021:
In a speech delivered via video before the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum held in Geneva in February 2021, the head of the new Libyan government, “Abdul Hamid Dabaiba”, called on all Libyan political and social forces to rally around the new executive authority, in order to rebuild the country, and expressed his readiness to work with everyone, regardless of their ideas, components, spectrums, and regions.
Although the appointment of “Dabaiba” as Prime Minister has brought a positive atmosphere to the Libyan political spectrum. However, there are a number of internal entitlements that remain before the new Libyan government. As for holding the general elections on December 24 of this year, he stressed that he will work to commit to holding them on the scheduled date and on democratic foundations, and will provide him with
The Ministry of Interior provides insurance and protection, with recourse and request for assistance from international organizations, including the United Nations, to support the elections logistically, and also in monitoring the elections ().
“Dabaiba” stated that Libya suffers from a major social rift, and therefore the special mission of this government is to maintain Libyan national unity in order to truly reunite the national ranks at home and abroad, so as to help its mechanisms succeed, in overcoming the challenges it faces, and the resistance it may be exposed to. He also said that “Libya suffers from poor services and failed local administration”, and in this context, his program focused on activating decentralized administration. This is consistent with one of the goals that the program seems to have set to address the complaint of centralized tyranny that citizens have suffered from for decades. This is by distancing executive institutions from political influence to achieve political or personal gains ().
Dabaiba added, “We will take education and training as a path to stability.” He pledged to end the conflict between Libyans, limit weapons to the state, and develop relations with neighboring countries. Regarding the situation of young people involved in the military field, his government included a detailed and well-thought-out program to absorb them and create job opportunities for them, not only in the army and police, but also in civilian institutions.
Regarding the swelling number of jobs in the public sector, he said that “the economic cycle is what solves the problem, through opening small, medium and large projects”, especially since 70% of the Libyan state budget goes to salaries, as the salaries item in the budget rose from 5 billion dollars in 2010 to 25 billion dollars in 2013. Accordingly, it is necessary to pump money into development, empty the public sector, and encourage the private sector and push it towards the industries we need internally. This will not happen without a real study of those who set monetary and financial policies().
Regarding the problem of power outages, he considered that “the crisis was exploited to obtain political gains”. He promised to focus on solving it within a period not exceeding 6 months, by benefiting from the experiences of neighboring countries that faced the same problem and to a greater extent as well.
He also promised to resolve the crisis of internally and externally displaced persons, and it will be part of his own program and on his list of priorities, especially those who have not been proven to be involved in murders or looting of public funds.
It seems that the program announced by Dabaiba skips over the complex and thorny crises that confuse the Libyan political, security and social scene. It also largely exceeds the time frame granted to his government, which does not exceed approximately nine months, and in light of the current circumstances, it has no choice but to focus on one goal, which is the most realistic, which is to achieve the progress of the political process and government institutions until the elections and maintain stability until they reach them.
In light of the social, political and economic conditions that the Libyan state has been experiencing for nearly ten years, there remains hope and optimism for the future of Libya, given the composition of the new government, which is distinguished by its “non-controversial” personalities, given that its members have not been involved in the conflict in the country since 2014, and did not have biased positions towards either party to the conflict during the recent war launched by the Libyan National Army forces on the capital, Tripoli().
The most important challenge that the government will face in reorganizing the Libyan house is related to reunifying the military institution and the position of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the new arrangements, especially since the army leadership file is the most important behind obstructing the path of settlement and reconciliation. The new government can take steps towards solving the problems if it shows a balanced and strong will, otherwise it will lose its legitimacy with Libyan society in a short time.
Fifth: The chances of success of the new government:
The new political agreement in Geneva gave a glimmer of hope for Libya to emerge from its current crisis, and the chances of success are enhanced after the international community saw the need to end the conflict completely and start a new phase, and sought to provide the new agreement with guarantees that would ensure that it would not fail, starting with the direct appointment of delegates to the Political Dialogue Forum, and the selection of the new executive body from among its members, through the pledge to send a UN team to supervise the implementation of the agreement, and reaching the readiness of Washington and several European capitals to hold accountable anyone who undermines the political process in Libya.
It seems clear that the Libyan parties have decided to prioritize the supreme interest of the nation over partisan and factional interests, and to push towards a political settlement, in response to the conviction of the Libyan forces that bullets are useless in excluding the other from the political equation, not to mention the high cost of the war, which no one can bear, especially after the devastating effects on Libya, which have drained its human energies and financial resources.
The success of the new Libyan government in facing the challenges facing it in achieving security and stability remains dependent on the extent of concessions that the Libyan political parties must make and the extent of flexibility that the armed groups must show in order to make it a success, so as not to waste what appears to be the last opportunity before the entire country slides into a quagmire of chaos. If the solution does not become a purely Libyan and comprehensive solution, the conditions will be ripe for Libya to become a stage for settling accounts of external powers, without neglecting the intersections of regional and international powers and their points of divergence with the current Libyan situation, and their positive and negative effects on Libya’s chances of emerging from the current state of crisis.
In any case, the political agreement has taken Libya out of the bottleneck and opened up new horizons for it that, if the Libyan parties adhere to what they have achieved and resist external pressures and dictates, may put Libya back on the right path. This requires concerted efforts between the Libyan components and the support of regional and international parties in order to accomplish it and overcome the obstacles that may contribute to its obstruction.
The Dabaiba government has a great opportunity to succeed in addressing the thorny issues and succeed in leading the country to the elections scheduled for late December of this year, as its members were not involved in the conflicts that the country witnessed, and were not part of the conflict that has been ongoing since 2014. In addition, there is an international trend led by the United States and the European Union that sees political consensus between the Libyan parties as a means to curb foreign interference that obstructs the settlement process. In an important step that will positively reflect on the situation in Libya, relations between Turkey and Egypt have witnessed developments that indicate a common desire for calm, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “his country does not mind dialogue with Egypt.” The two parties enjoy great influence on the Libyan scene, especially in light of the strong support that Haftar enjoys from Egypt, while Turkey, in return, supports the Sarraj government. Turkish and Egyptian support for a ceasefire in Libya and non-alignment with the two parties to the Libyan conflict may be a calming factor for the policy of the raging regional axes in Libya().
In light of the above, and taking into account the local, regional and international contexts, the new Libyan government finds itself facing three possible scenarios:
That all Libyan parties continue to support the new government and unify efforts towards Libya reaching the presidential and parliamentary elections on December 24 of this year without any potential conflict, in light of the international community’s insistence on moving forward with implementing the roadmap agreed upon in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, which is the preferred scenario.
Extending the transitional period, as it is likely that the critical situation in Libya may prevent the transitional government from achieving any noteworthy achievement on various political, economic and security levels, which prompts the international community to extend the transitional period.
The political agreement may falter in the coming stages, and the situation will return to square one, given that the transitional government does not have the significant and effective power on the ground, not to mention the limited time frame and the intensity of external interventions, which makes the conflict likely to return again and threatens the collapse of the transitional government. What supports this scenario is that the Joint Military Committee was unable to remove foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, and the United Nations did not take any tangible steps in this regard, which makes the possibility of the return of armed conflict and the instability of the situation in Libya more likely. This has made some Libyan forces very skeptical about the chances of the political agreement succeeding and a real breakthrough that would take the country out of the series of successive political and security crises, and move it to a new state that would put it on the path of stability and development. In light of the current situation and the existing local, regional and international complications, the chances of the three scenarios appear to be present and open, and it is difficult to weigh the chances of success for any of them, with a relative advantage in favor of the political solution scenario, but the matter depends primarily on the will of the conflicting Libyan forces, and on the will of the regional and international parties active in the Libyan conflict.
The most prominent procedural steps that may help resolve the details of the internal disputes and establish a solution with a broad national vision that spares the country any future shocks and helps in finding important and long-term solutions are some proposals that may contribute to pushing towards a comprehensive settlement, and without that, the political process cannot move forward, including the following:
The commitment of the Libyan parties to an immediate ceasefire and all combat operations that would drain Libya’s human energies and waste its economic and financial resources.
The keenness of the Libyan forces to preserve the unity of the country and prevent its division on political, geographical or regional grounds.
Neighboring countries, regional and international parties should stop supporting both sides of the Libyan conflict with weapons and equipment and push towards the success of reconciliation efforts.
Overcoming obstacles that may hinder the new political agreement reached in Libya and the commitment of international parties to its outcomes, and holding accountable all those who threaten stability or undermine the settlement process. Without this, the political process cannot advance towards settlement.
Achieving true reconciliation requires developing a clear Libyan roadmap based on scientific and realistic foundations and a political vision that defines the basics of the national issue and its broad outlines, obligating all parties and protecting them from factionalism, monopolization and the temptations of governance, while not politicizing the army and keeping it away from the circle of political influence, especially since the army leadership file is the most important and prominent file behind obstructing settlement efforts.
The success of the settlement requires a Libyan-Libyan concession on the basis of a political consensus that supports the country instead of supporting one party against the other, and then focusing on building a security and military system on national foundations, in which regional and provincial dimensions are absent and merged, integrating the military component on both sides of the conflict within the framework of a unified national army with an agreed upon military commander who does not belong to either party to the conflict, and who is not entitled to civil authority while he is still in this position, nor is he entitled to initiate any military circumvention or coup against civilian political life under any circumstances, and his mission is to defend Libya, its interests and sovereignty under a unity government, because the militarization of the state is the disease of the existing conflict.
Conclusion:
Libya is facing major challenges today in the path of disengaging from the external forces that influence the Libyan domestic arena, in addition to the severe polarization that the country has been experiencing since February 2011. However, pushing Libya back to the brink of conflict and instability is the last thing that the countries of the region want, as the crisis that the country could witness does not only concern the Libyans, but the entire region.
There is no doubt that the new Libyan political agreement and the election of the new Libyan government are an important international breakthrough in the path to ending the Libyan conflict, and the culmination of diplomatic efforts.
Intensive and political negotiations under the auspices of the UN mission, which is an important way out, and a wide margin for liberating the Libyan parties from the pressure of conflict and its risks to the future of the settlement and its success. However, this requires significant guarantees from influential international powers such as the United States and the European Union in order to curb foreign interventions that fuel division among Libyans. The chances of the new government’s success in performing its assigned tasks remain dependent on the continued support of the United Nations and its support mission in Libya. In this regard, the United Nations should play a more present and effective role in dealing with the Libyan crisis, through efforts to disarm the armed militias within a specific time frame, and imposing strict sanctions on local parties obstructing the dialogue, as well as external parties that violate the decision to ban the supply of weapons to Libya. However, if the United Nations and the active international powers fail to contain the Libyan crisis, and the active regional powers in the Libyan scene do not agree on the transitional line to reach the elections scheduled for the end of December 2021, then tension will prevail, and it will have a strong impact on the outcome of the political situation in Libya in the future, so that a scenario similar to the Skhirat scenario and the Presidential Council that emerged from it will be repeated, which opens the door to a new extension of the transitional phase, and makes it likely that the conflict will return again, which portends the collapse of the tasks of the transitional government.
In light of the data of the political and military conflict that characterizes the Libyan scene, and the resulting regional and international tensions, in addition to the emergence of a complex and intertwined situation of alliances and interests, in which the calculations of the game of influence and control are managed on narrow pragmatic foundations that do not see the strategic Libyan interests in national reconciliation; This file is open to many scenarios, according to the outcomes of the conflict interactions, and the extent of the keenness and willingness of the political and military parties to make real concessions, away from the influence of narrow interests based on regional and local ambitions, in order to make it a success through comprehensive national work that goes beyond the negatives and polarizations of war and settling scores, and distances the country from political and ideological conflicts, and their high price for social peace, development, stability, and national unity.
In light of this complex and intertwined regional and international reality, any country seeking to possess its will and independence and avoid the negative effects of external interventions must fortify its internal front by achieving more community partnership, consensus, and coexistence among its citizens. And providing possible and necessary facilities that would heal the internal Libyan rift in accordance with the logic of the national interest. Exploiting the available opportunities to rearrange the Libyan house, and overcoming the challenges ahead, is capable of contributing to shaping the horizons of the Libyan state and its future. As long as negative foreign interventions continue, Libyan society will continue to suffer from division and disintegration, especially since signs of division, due to foreign intervention, are looming on the horizon.
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